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of labor supply, b) there is a finite number of firms operating under Cournot competition
on the labor market. We show that given a free-entry and zero profit conditions, we
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1 Introduction
Although the economic effect of monopsony and oligopsony power in the labor
market are well known and studied for some particular labor market, as heavily
documented in Manning [19], the macroeconomic consequences of firms’ market
power in the labor market through monopsony are less investigated. One poten-
tial reason is that the view of a unique firm on the labor market at the aggregate
level seems unplausible. Yet, several arguments tend justify the case for monop-
sony power on the labor market outside the one firm-one market case. From
a theoretical point of view, a group of firms may not face an infinitely-elastic
labor supply as in the standard view of labor market but an upward-sloping
supply.1 Also, a labor market may be characterized by a finite number of firms
which implies a form of concentration on the demand side. Recent empirical
contributions of Azar et al. [1], [2] and also Webber [21] supports these features
and points out that monopsony power and its macroeconomic effects are more
significant than we previously thought.
The present paper proposes to account for firms’ market power in the labor
market in an otherwise standard general equilibrium model and shed light on
a new and less expected effect: monopsony power may cause aggregate insta-
bility and be a source of expectation-driven fluctuations. A similar mechanism
has been found by Dos Santos Ferreira and Lloyd-Braga [9], [10] and Jaimovich
[15] where imperfect competition in the product markets and an endogenous
markup on price leads to an economy with local indeterminacy and sunspot
equilibria.2 Different from these contributions that assume a perfectly compet-
itive labor market, we exploit the symmetry between the markup on price and
the markdown on wage3 to exhibit this original effect of monopsony power.
To introduce firms’ market power, we consider that labor supplied by the
households is an imperfect substitute across different labor markets and in which
firms are large enough, but low with respect to the economy. As a result, we
capture two sources of monopsony power: on the one hand, firms face an upward-
sloping labor supply at the individual level, on the other hand, there is some
concentration of firms on the labor markets. We assume that firms operate
under Cournot competition on labor markets and that the number of firms is
1Note that monopsony power also arises in presence of frictions on the labor markets. This
is another way to consider upward-sloping labor supply.
2The significance of firms’ market power in the product markets at the aggregate level also
received recent supports by empirical studies (see for instance De Loecker and Eeckhout [8]).
3Both markup and markdown have a similar effect on the real wage paid to the workers
which is lower than the marginal product of labor and is decreasing with firms’ market power.
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endogenous by introducing a symmetric free-entry condition. Accordingly, firms’
market power, measured by the size of the markup on wage, depends on the de-
gree of substitutability of labor supply across markets and the level of economic
activity. In particular, firms have a significantly large market power when the
substitutability is low and the markup on wage is decreasing with the level of
activity as suggested by empirical evidence (see Jaimovich [15] and Jaimovich
and Floetotto [16] for evidence of countercyclical markup, and Hirsch et al. [12]
for empirical evidence of a countercyclical monopsony power). The rest of the
model is standard with respect to the literature: we consider infinitely-lived
households with separable preferences supplies an infinitely-elastic amount of
total labor and choose an optimal plan over time for capital and consumption.
Firms have access to a constant return to scale general production allowing for
capital and labor substitution and choose their production plan under monop-
olistic competition on the product markets.
We show that given a minimal degree of monopolistic competition and a
high enough substitutability of labor and capital, local indeterminacy arises if
the elasticity of substitution of labor across markets is low enough, i.e. when
monopsony power is large. Through a numerical illustration, we conclude that
this outcome is plausible for a large set of OECD countries. The reason for
the emergence of expectation-driven fluctuations in this economy follows that if
there is an optimistic expectation about the future, say households anticipate
an increase of the wage rate in the future, there is a boom in investment leading
to new profit opportunities, and entry of new firms in the market. Since the
markdown is countercyclical, the creation of new firms decreases marginal cost
due to a more intense competition which shifts production up and makes the
initial expectation self-fulfilling.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model
and define the equilibrium solution of agents’ behaviour. In Section 3, we focus
on the benchmark case where only oligopsony power is considered and study the
local dynamics of this benchmark economy. Section 3 contains our main results,
provides a numerical illutrastrion to discuss the plausiblity of our conclusions
and gives some economic intuition. In Section 5, we draw some concluding
comments and all the proofs are given in the Appendix.
2 The Model
This section describes the details of an infinite horizon economy characterized by
oligopsonistic labor markets and presents the subsequent equilibrium conditions.
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2.1 Households’ behavior
We consider an economy populated by a large number of identical infinitely-
lived agents. We assume without loss of generality that the total population is
constant and normalized to one. At each point in time, an agent supplies an
infinitely-elastic amount of labor l(t) ∈ [0, l¯], with l¯ > 1 his time endowment and
chooses the allocation of hours worked in labor market i ∈ I, l(i, t). She derives
her intertemporal utility from consumption c(t) and disutility from labor l(t)
according to the instantaneous utility function U(ct, lt) such that:
U(c(t), l(t)) = ln(c(t))−Bl(t) (1)
Where B is a scaling constant. Households face the following budget con-
straint:
k˙(t) + c(t) + δk(t) =
w(t)
p(t)
l(t) +
r(t)
p(t)
k(t) (2)
with k(t) the capital stock, with initial condition k(0) = k0, w(t) the wage
rate, r(t) the rental rate of capital and δ > 0 the depreciation rate of the capital
stock, p(t) the price index. Denote the discount rate by ρ > 0 and λ the shadow
price of capital, the current-value Hamiltonian writes:
H = ln(c(t))−Bl(t) + λ(t)
[
w(t)
p(t)
l(t) +
r(t)
p(t)
k(t)− δk(t)− c(t)
]
(3)
The first-order conditions are:
c(t)−1 = λ(t) (4)
B = λ(t)
w(t)
p(t)
(5)
λ˙(t)
λ(t)
= (ρ+ δ)− r(t)
p(t)
(6)
k˙(t) =
w(t)
p(t)
l(t) +
r(t)
p(t)
k(t)− δk(t)− c(t) (7)
Any solution needs also to satisfy the transversality condition:
lim
t→+∞ e
−ρtλ(t)k(t) = 0 (8)
We assume that households’ labor supply is imperfectly substitutable among
many labor markets indexed by i. In particular, the households’ total labor
supply takes the form:
3
l(t) =
(∫ 1
0
l(i)
1+γ
γ di
) γ
1+γ
(9)
where γ ∈ (0,+∞) is the elasticity of substitution of hours worked across
markets i. Note that we omit the time variable for all the variable depending on
i since they are going to be characterized by static solutions.4 This specification
is considered by Berger, Herkenhoff and Mongey [6], Horvath [13] and Huang
and Meng [14] while Cardi and Restout [7] and Katayama and Kim [18] follows
an identical formulation but restricts to a two sector economy. When γ tends
to infinity, the utility cost of modifying hours worked in labor markets i toward
another is low and workers favors move their whole time endowment to the
labor market with the highest wage. Hence, firms adjust their labor demand
to attract workers which leads to wage equalization across all labors markets.
In such case, as will be shown below, firms’ labor market power is minimal and
close to perfect competition. In constrast, when γ is finite and low, a minimal
disutility of labor is obtained when workers share an equal working time between
the different markets disregarding wage differences: this configuration implies a
large labor market power for the firms.
Households’ labor income satisfies w(t)l(t) =
∫ 1
0
w(i)l(i)di. Given the latter
and equation (9), the optimal allocation of sectoral labor supply is:
l(i)
l(t)
=
(
w(i)
w(t)
)γ
(10)
with w(t), the wage index:
w(t) =
(∫ 1
0
w(i)1+γdi
) 1
1+γ
(11)
A possible interpretation of equation (10) can be done as a labor supply in
market i relative to total labor supply. When γ tends to 0, then the households
inelastically supply a share of their total labor supply to market i, irrespective
the difference of the wage of this market with the wage index. If γ tends to-
ward infinity, labor supply is infinitely elastic between sectors and freely moves
between them leading to wage equalization as labor is perfectly substitutable
across markets. Hence, γ can be interpreted as a wage elasticity of labor.
4The assumption of a continuum of labor market is a mere simplification. It is easily shown
that our results do not depend on a discrete number of labor markets. As a result, under the
present formulation, labor markets can be seen as local geographical markets but could be
also seen as sectoral labor markets if a discrete formulation is introduced.
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2.2 The production structure
2.2.1 Firms’ decisions
There is a final good y(t) produced using n intermediate goods yj(t) according
to a CES technology :
y(t) =
 n∑
j=1
yj(t)
φ−1
φ

φ
φ−1
(12)
where φ > 0 is the elasticity of substitution between the intermedi-
ate goods. Denote the price of the intermediate good by pj(t) and p =(∑n
j=1 pj(t)
1−φ
)1/(1−φ)
, the demand of the intermediate good is given by :
yj(t)
y(t)
=
(
pj(t)
p(t)
)−φ
(13)
In the industry j, there is a unique firm j which is small with respect to
the whole economy and produce the intermediate good yj(t). Each firm j ∈ J
has access to a constant return to scale technology yj(t) = Af(kj(t), lj(t)) =
Alj(t)f(aj(t)) with f(aj(t)) increasing and concave, f(0) = 0 and f(+∞) = +∞
and where aj(t) =
kj(t)
lj(t)
, the intensive stock of capital used by firm j. We impose
the following assumption about the production function :
Assumption 1. The function f(aj(t)) is twice differentiable, increasing and
concave and satisfies f ′(0) = +∞, f ′(+∞) = 0
We define s(aj) =
ajf
′(aj)
f(aj)
, the elasticity of the production with respect
to the intensive stock of capital and σ(aj) =
−(1−s(aj)f ′(aj)
ajf ′′(aj)
, the capital-labor
elasticity of substitution. The firm also faces a fixed cost F . Furthermore,
since there are n(i, t) firms within each labor market i and a unique firm on the
n(t) intermediate good markets, we assume Cournot competition over labor but
monopolistic competition on the product markets. It follows that firm j takes
into account the demand for good j and the labor supply in labor market i as
respectively given by equations (10) and (13). Hence, the profit maximization
program is given by:
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pij = max
yj ,lj ,kj
p(yj(t))yj(t)− w(l(i))lj(t)− r(t)kj(t)
s.t. yj(t) = Alj(t)f(aj(t))− F
p(yj(t)) = p(t)
(
yj(t)
y(t)
)−1
φ
w(l(i)) = w(t)
(
l(i)
l(t)
) 1
γ
l(i) =
∑n
j=1 lj(t)
(14)
The first-order conditions are :
r(t)
pj(t)
= (1− εp)Af ′(a(t))
w(i)
pj(t)
=
(1−εp)
(1+εw)
A[f(a(t))− a(t)f ′(a(t))]
yj(t) = Alj(t)f(aj(t))− F
(15)
with εp ≡ 1φ and εw ≡ ∂w∂lj
lj
w =
lj
γ
∑
J lj
which are respectively the markup
rule on price and the markdown on the wage rate. It follows that the markup
decreases when the substitutability of the intermediate goods while and the
markdown decreases when the wage elasticity of labor supply in market i in-
creases.
2.3 Symmetric Equilibrium
We consider a symmetric equilibrium n(t) = n(i, t) with the following aggregate
variables k(t) = n(t)kj(t), l(t) ≡ l(t) = n(t)lj(t), y(t) = n(t)yj(t), p(t) ≡ pj(t)
and w(t) ≡ w(t). It follows that the markdown on the wage is given by
εw ≡ εw(n(t)) = 1γn(t) . Note that the latter expression implies that the
markdown evolves in an opposite direction with respect to the number of
firms: a higher number of firms implies ceteris paribus a tougher competi-
tion and reduces the markdown on wage which increases, in return the wage rate.
Given a symmetric equilibrium, we introduce a free-entry restriction which
leads to the usual zero profit condition:
n(t)l(t)
[
f(a(t))− w(t)
p(t)
− r(t)
p(t)
a(t)
]
= F (16)
Using the latter condition, the definition of the production technology, y(t) =
Al(t)f(a(t)− F , and the first-order conditions (15), we find5
5From now on, it is assumed that n(t) evolves continuously.
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Al(t)f(a(t)) = [1+εw(n(t))]n(t)F[(1−s)(1−εp)εw(n(t))+εp(1+εw(n(t)))]
y(t) =
(1−εp)[1+s(a(t))εw(n(t))]n(t)F
[(1−s)(1−εp)εw(n(t))+εp(1+εw(n(t)))]
(17)
From these expressions and the first-order conditions, the interest rate and
the wage rate write:
r(t)
p(t) =
s(a(t))[1+εw(n(t))]y(t)
[1(t)+s(a(t))εw(n(t))]k(t)
w(t)
p(t) =
[1−s(a(t))]y(t)
[1+s(a(t))εw(n(t))]l(t)
(18)
Where the aggregate price index p(t) is normalized to unity from now on. In
the next section, we define the intertemporal equilibrium of this economy and
derive steady state conclusions.
2.4 Intertemporal equilibrium and steady state analysis
Recall that a(t) = k(t)l(t) . We solve the system (17) to get n(k(t), y(t)) and
l(k(t), y(t)). It follows that εw(n(t)) ≡ εw(k(t), y(t)) and a(t) ≡ a(k(t), y(t)) =
k(t)
l(k(t),y(t)) from which we derive s(a(t)) ≡ s(k(t), y(t)), w(t) ≡ w(k(t), y(t)),
r(t) ≡ r(k(t), y(t)) and σ(a(t)) ≡ σ(k(t), y(t)).6
We combine the first-order conditions (4)-(5) and obtain the equilibrium
value of consumption:
Bc(k(t), y(t)) =
(1− s(k(t), y(t)))y(t)
[1 + s(k(t), y(t))εw(k(t), y(t))]l(k(t), y(t))
(19)
We differentiate with respect to time the first-order condition (4) and (19)
to get:
λ˙(t)
λ(t)
= εcy
y˙(t)
y(t)
+ εck
k˙(t)
k(t)
(20)
with εcy =
∂c(k(t),y(t))
∂y(t)
y(t)
c(k(y(t),k(t)) and εck =
∂c(k(t),y(t))
∂k(t)
k(t)
c(k(y(t),k(t)) . We substi-
tute this expression in equation (6) to write the Euler equation :
y˙(t)
y(t)
=
(
s(k(t),y(t))(1+εw(k(t),y(t))y(t)
k(t)(1+s(k(t),y(t))εw(k(t),y(t))
− (ρ+ δ)− εck k˙(t)k(t)
)
εcy
(21)
From the households’ budget constraint, we obtain the aggregat resource con-
straint:
k˙(t) = y(t)− δk(t)− c(k(t), y(t)) (22)
6In Appendix (5.3), we obtain the elasticities of l(t) and n(t) with respect to k(t) and y(t),
εl,k ,εl,y , ,εn,k and εn,y
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An intertemporal equilibrium is a path {k(t), y(t)}t≥0 with k(0) = k0 > 0,
satisfying equations (21)-(22) and the transversality condition (8).
A steady state is a solution (k∗, a∗, c∗, y∗, n∗), satisfying:
c∗ = y∗ − δk∗
s(a∗)(1+εw(n∗))y∗
[(1+s(a∗)εw(n∗))k∗]
= (ρ+ δ)
Ak
∗
a∗ f(a
∗) = [1+εw(n
∗)]n∗F
[(1−s(a∗))(1−εp)εw(n∗)+εp(1+εw(n∗)]
y∗ = (1−εp)(1+s(a
∗)εw(n∗))n∗F
[(1−s(a∗))(1−εp)εw(n∗)+εp(1+εw(n∗)]
Bc∗ = (1−s(a
∗))a∗y∗
[1+s(a∗)εw(n∗)]k∗
(23)
with a∗ = k∗/l∗, s(a∗) = a
∗f ′(a∗)
f(a∗) and εw(n
∗) = 1γn∗ . Solving the previous
system gives:
c∗ = [ρ+δ(1−s)+sρε(n
∗)](1−εp)n∗F
(ρ+δ)[(1−s(a∗))(1−εp)εw(n∗)+εp(1+εw(n∗)]
k∗ = s(a
∗)(1+ε(n∗))(1−εp)∗F
(ρ+δ)[(1−s(a∗))(1−εp)εw(n∗)+εp(1+εw(n∗)]
Af ′(a∗) = (ρ+δ)(1−εp)
y∗ = (1−εp)(1+s(a
∗)εw(n∗))n∗F
[(1−s(a∗))(1−εp)εw(n∗)+εp(1+εw(n∗)]
B [ρ+δ(1−s(a
∗))+s(a∗)ρ+εw(n∗)](1+εw(n∗)nF
[(1−s(a∗))(1−εp)εw(n∗)+εp(1+εw(n∗)] =
(ρ+δ)2a∗(1−s(a∗))
s(a∗)(1−εp)
(24)
We can now derive a first result about the steady state:
Proposition 1. Under Assumption 1, a steady state (k∗, a∗, c∗, y∗, n∗) exists
and is unique.
Proof : see Appendix 5.1
Exploiting the uniqueness of the steady state, we also find :
Proposition 2. Define the steady state share of labor income as w
∗l∗
y∗ =
(1−s(a)∗)
(1+s(a∗)εw(n∗)
. Then, an increase in monopsony power (due to a decrease in
the elasticity of substitution of labor γ or a decrease in n∗) decreases the equi-
librium number of firms and the steady state share of labor income.
Proof : see Appendix 5.2
We use the scaling parameters A,B > 0 to ensure the existence of a nor-
malized steady state (NSS) with a∗ = 1 and n∗ = n¯, an arbitrary number
of firms, which remains invariant with respect to preferences and technological
parameters. Hence, we derive:
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Proposition 3. Under Assumption 1, the solution (k∗, 1, c∗, y∗, n¯) of the system
(24) is a NSS if and only if A = A∗ and B = B∗ with
A∗ = (ρ+δ)s(1)f(1)
B∗ = (ρ+δ)
2(1−s(1))[(1−s(1))(1−εp)εw(n¯)+εp(1+εw(n¯)]
s(1)(1−εp)[ρ+δ(1−s(1))+s(1)ρ+εw(n¯)](1+εw(n¯))n¯F
This normalization procedure allows to use parameters of interest εw ≡ εw(n¯),
σ ≡ σ(1) and s ≡ s(1) that are independent of the steady state.
We devote the next section to study the stability of properties of the model.
In particular, we analytically derive the main results of this paper, that an
economy concerned by a strong monopsony power on the labor market may
experience expectation-driven fluctuations through local indeterminacy, then
we discuss the likelihood of our results through a quantitative exercise.
3 Expectation-driven Fluctuations and Aggre-
gate Instability
To study the local dynamics, we linearize the system (21)-(22) around the NSS.
The characteristic polynomial of the Jacobian matrix is given by P (λ) = λ2 −
Trλ+Det with:
Det = (ρ+δ)V (εw)P (εw)
Tr = ρ− (ρ+δ)εpεw(1−s)P (εw)
where :
V (εw) = avε
2
w + bvεw + cv, P (εw) = apε
2
w + bpεw + cp
av =
[
1 + sρρ+δ(1−s) +
εp
(1−s)(1−εp)
]
, ap =
[
1− 2s(1−εp)σ − sεpσ(1−s)
]
bv =
[
2 +
εp
(1−s)(1−εp)
]
, bp =
[
2s(1−εp)
σ +
2sεp
σ(1−s) − εp
]
cv =
2εp
(1−s)(1−εp) , cp =
−sεp
σ(1−s)
(25)
Given that we have one predetermined variable, the necessary and sufficient
conditions to obtain a sink, and therefore local indeterminacy, are D > 0 and
Tr < 0 while the NSS displays saddle-path stability if D < 0 and is a source if
and only if D > 0 and Tr > 0. Furthermore, a Hopf bifurcation occurs when
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D > 0 and Tr = 0. In that case, the economy displays persistent fluctuations
through the emergence of period cycles.7
Note that εw = 1γn¯ so that, for any given n¯, the parameter εw ∈ (0,+∞) is
varying continuously through the parameter γ which measures the substitutabil-
ity of labor supply across industries and reflects the degree of firms’ monopsony
power.
We derive first a proposition that ensures saddle-path stability of the NSS:
Proposition 4. Under Assumption 1, there exists σ > 0 such that the NSS is
always locally determinate if σ < σ.
Proof: see Appendix 5.5
After deriving when local indeterminacy is ruled out, the following Proposi-
tion establishes our main results :
Proposition 5. Under Assumption 1, there is a critical value σ > 0, such that
for any given value σ > σ and εp > 0, there exists ε¯w and εw ∈ (0, ε¯w) such
the NSS is a saddle-path if and only if εw ∈ (0, εw), is a sink if and only if
εw ∈ (εw, ε¯w), undergoes a Hopf bifurcation if εw = ε¯w and is a source if and
only εw > ε¯w.
Proof : see Appendix 5.6
From this Proposition, we derive that local indeterminacy and expectation-
driven fluctuations require a low enough γ (i.e. a high monopsonic power from
the firms) given that the capital and labor are substitute enough. It is worth
noticing that the condition εw > εw and σ > σ implies an upward-sloping
labor demand as in Benhabib and Farmer [4]. Note that this condition is
also equivalent to a positive consumption-output equilibrium relationship as it
implies εcy > 0. The economic mechanism for expectation-driven fluctuations
goes as follows. Departing from the steady state, Assume that households have
an expectation of a future wage increase and anticipate therefore the labor
supply to increase. This makes future interest rate more attractive which leads
to a soar in investment. Since the capital stock in the present is predetermined,
households must increase their labor supply to provide the necessary additional
output. This leads to the creation of new firms and reduces the markdown
which results in an increase in the current wage. The initial expectation is
7see Beaudry, Galizia and Portier [5] for a recent investigation about the empirical relevance
of cyclical fluctuations.
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therefore self-fulfilling.
To discuss the plausibility of our results, we consider a crude but indicative
calibration of the deep parameters our model. We consider the following:
Parameters s ρ δ εp σ
Values 0.3 0.001 0.02 0.05 (0.6,2.5)
The first three parameters have been chosen according on a quaterly basis
and so that to match an annual return of capital of 8 per cent. We also consider
a small value of εp as a benchmark case and to avoid strong deviations from
perfect competition on the product markets. Considering a particular value
for the capital-labor elasticity of substitution is more problematic: while most
recent contributions conclude that capital and labor are complement (σ < 1),
the highest estimates found in the literature focus on a value of σ between 1.25
and 3.25 (see Duffy and Papageorgiou [11] and Karagiannis et al. [17]). We first
compute the value of σ = 0.58 implying that for most of the empirical value of
σ, the relevant condition is σ > σ.
Given this condition, we find that local indeterminacy occurs for any value
of the markdown εw ∈ (1, 42, 2.27) if σ = 0.8 and εw ∈ (0.6, 1.16) if σ = 1.5
Assuming n¯ = 2, we plot the critical values of γ leading to local indetermi-
nacy for the relevant range of σ in Figure 3. The lower line is the values of the
Hopf bifurcation while the upper line represents the necessary condition on γ.
As shown by figure 3, local indeterminacy occurs for any γ ∈ (0.22, 0.35) if
σ = 0.8 and γ ∈ (0.72, 1.70) if σ = 2.5. Furthermore, the interval between the
lower and upper bound gets wider as σ increases. Furthermore, an increase in
εp shifts both curve downward
Such values have to be compared with known estimates of γ which highly
depends on how this parameters is interpreted. If the interpretation of the in-
dividual wage elasticity of labor supply is assumed, the literature review by
Reichling and Whalen [20] concludes of a range γ ∈ (0.27, 0.53) with a central
tendency around 0.4. The investigations made by Berger, Hergenkoff and Mon-
gey [6] and Katayama and Kim [18] find a value of γ around unity for the recent
years.
A detailed country estimation is provided by Cardi and Restout [7] in their
two sector framework. Using panel techniques, they find that the average value
of γ for main OECD countries is around 0.62, with a minimum of 0.216 and a
11
Figure 1: Plot of destabilizing values of γ for varying σ. Red lines are the Hopf
birfucation while blue lines are the necessary conditions. Solid lines are plotted
for ε = 0.05, while dashed lines are for εp = 0.18.
maximum of 1.82.8 We conclude therefore that monopsony power on the labor
market is likely to be a source of destabilization, even with a minimal degree of
imperfect competition on the product market.
4 Concluding Comments
This paper considers firms’ monopsony power on the labor market as a poten-
tial source of expectation-driven fluctuations in a dynamic general equilibrium
model. While the effect of monopsony power on wage and participation are
well document, its consequence on dynamic properties, and in particular for
the emergence of local indeterminacy, is less, if not, studied. To investigate
such properties, we considered a simple model where households’ labor supply
is imperfectly substitutable across labor markets implying that firms in a labor
market face an upward-sloping labor supply. As a result, firms exert a market
power by paying a wage that is lower than the marginal product of labor. Given
minimal assumptions, we show that local indeterminacy arises as soon as this
8The following countries are considered: Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Great Britain, Ger-
many, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Netherland, Spain, Sweden, US over the period 1971-2007.
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market power is large enough, capital and labor are substitutes and we find that
our results are plausible according a numerical illustration.
These conclusions stands within a wide range of literature. First, it com-
pletes and converges to the conclusion of Dos Santos Ferreira and Lloyd-Braga
[9], [10] and Jaimovich [15] who study the emergence of local indeterminacy
and expectation-driven fluctuations under oligopolistic competition and free-
entry. It also contributes to the general equilibrium modelling of firms’ labor
market power in imperfectly competitive economy as recently renewed by Azar
and Vives [3] or Berger, Herkenhoff and Mongey [6]. While the consideration of
imperfect substitutability of labor supply has attracted more and more contribu-
tions, in particular in the DSGE literature (e.g. Cardi and Restout [7], Horvath
[13], Huang and Meng [14], Katayama and Kim [18]), most of them still consider
a perfectly competitive labor market ruling out firms’ market power on this mar-
ket and leaving aside potentially significant effects at the macroeconomic level.
5 Appendix
5.1 Proof of Proposition 1
From the third equation of the system (24) and under Assumption 1,
we notice that there is a unique a∗. Hence, all the terms in the last
equation varies with n∗ only and we can show that the left-hand side
tends to zero when n∗ = 0 while it tends to +∞ as n becomes arbi-
trary large. Furthermore, the left-hand side is strictly increasing with re-
spect to n∗ implying that n∗ is also unique. Since k∗, c∗ and y∗ de-
pends only on a∗ and n∗, the rest of the system admits a unique solution.
5.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Consider the expression for the share of labor income, α = (1−s(a)
∗)
(1+s(a∗)εw(n∗)
. An
increase in the market power means that the markdown on wage εw increases.
We easily obtain that the derivative of the latter expression is given by:
dα
dεw
=
−(1− s(a∗)s(a∗)
[(1 + s(a∗)εw(n∗)]
2 (26)
Although it is trivial to show that εw is decreasing with respect to n∗or γ,
there is also a steady state relationship between the n∗ and γ. From the last
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equation of the system (24), we can derive implicitly that dn
∗
dγ > 0. We conclude
therefore:
dα
dγ
=
(1− s(a∗)s(a∗)
[(1 + s(a∗)εw(n∗)]
2
(1 + dn
∗
dγ )
(γn∗)2
(27)
5.3 Derivation of the main elasticities
Using equations in (17) and the definition of s = af
′(a)
f(a) with a =
k
l , we get:
εly =
(1+εw)∆+(1−s)(1−εp)εw
(1−s)E(1+εw)∆
εlk =
−s[E(1+sεw)+(1− 1σ )εw]
(1−s)E(1+sεw)
εny =
∆+(1− 1σ )sεw(1−εp)
E∆
εnk =
−s(1− 1σ )εw(1+εw)
E(1+sεw)∆
E =
[
1− (1− 1σ ) sεw1+sεw +
(1−s)εw
(1+sεw)∆
)
]
∆ = [(1− s)(1− εp)εw + εp(1 + εw)]
(28)
We also derive the elasticities for w,r and s = af
′(a)
f(a) with a =
k
l , as a
function of the above elasticites. It follows:
εwy = 1− εly + sεw1+sεw εny +
s(1+εw)
(1+sεw)
(1− 1σ )εly
εwk = −εlk + sεw1+sεw εnk −
s(1+εw)
(1+sεw)
(1− 1σ )(1− εlk)
εry = 1− (1−s)εw(1+sεw)(1+εw)εny −
(1−s)
(1+sεw)
(1− 1σ )εly
εrk = −1− (1−s)εw(1+sεw)(1+εw)εnk +
(1−s)
(1+sεw)
(1− 1σ )(1− εlk)εsy = −(1− s)(1− 1σ )εly
εsk = (1− s)(1− 1σ )(1− εlk)
(29)
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5.4 Derivation of the determinant and the trace of the
Jacobian matrix
Note that form equation (19), we find that εcy = εwy and εck = εwk. Using
the expressions given in (29), we can now linearize the system (21)-(22) in the
neighborhood of the steady state to obtain:(
dy˙
dk˙
)
= J
(
dy
dk
)
(30)
with J the Jacobian matrix given by:
J =

(ρ+δ)εry− yk εwk(1−εwy cy )
εwy
y
k
[
(ρ+δ)εrk+
y
k εwk(δ+εwk
c
k )
εwy
]
(1− εwy cy ) −(δ + εwk ck )

After some tedious computations, the trace and the determinant of the Ja-
cobian matrix are obtained:
beginequation
V (εw) = avε
2
w + bvεw + cv, P (εw) = apε
2
w + bpεw + cp
av =
[
1 + sρρ+δ(1−s) +
εp
(1−s)(1−εp)
]
, ap =
[
1− 2s(1−εp)σ − sεpσ(1−s)
]
bv =
[
2 +
εp
(1−s)(1−εp)
]
, bp =
[
2s(1−εp)
σ +
2sεp
σ(1−s) − εp
]
cv =
2εp
(1−s)(1−εp) , cp =
−sεp
σ(1−s)
5.5 Proof of Proposition 4
Consider the Determinant. The numerator of the determinant is a polynomial
of degree two, V (εw) with positive coefficient av, bv, cv > 0. The two roots
have the same sign since their product share the same sign than cvav > 0 and
are negative since the sign of sum of the two roots satisfies −bvav < 0. Because
V (0) > 0, we conclude that V (εw) is always positive for any εw > 0.
The denominator of the Determinant is also a polynomial of degree two. For
any σ < σ = s(1−s) [(1− s)(1− εp) + sεp], we have ap, bp, cp < 0 and therefore,
cp
ap
> 0 and −bpap < 0, meaning that both roots of P (εw) are also negative.
Because P (ε) < 0, we find P (εw) < 0 for any εw > 0 and the Determinant is
therefore always negative.
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5.6 Proof of Proposition 5
From the previous Proposition and the Trace, we derive that a necessary con-
dition for local indeterminacy is P (εw) > 0 and it requires σ > σ. In such case,
we find that ap > 0 while bp, cp < 0 and one of the roots is positive while the
other is negative. Since P (εw) is convex, there exists therefore a critical point
εw > 0 such that we get P (εw) < 0 for any εw ∈ (0, εw) and the Determinant
is negative while P (εw) > 0 for any εw ∈ (εw,+∞) which leads to a positive
Determinant.
Note that for any εp = 0, the Trace is positive and equal to ρ. We assumre
therefore εp > 0. The Trace writes:
Tr =
H(εw)
P (εw)
(31)
with H(εw) = ahε2w + bhεw + ch and ah = ρap>0, bh = [
2sεp
σ(1−s) +
2s(1−εp)
σ +
ρ + δ(1 − s) + sρ] > 0 and ch = ρcp < 0. Similarly to P (εw), the polynomial
H(εw) has one positive root, say ε¯w and one negative and non relevant root,
and is negative for any εw ∈ (0, ε¯w) and positive other.
Hence, without loss of generality, for any εw ∈ (εw, ε¯w), the Trace is negative
and the steady state is locally indeterminate (i.e. a sink) while the Trace is
positive and the NSS is a source for any εw > ε¯w. Furthermore, the critical
point ε¯w is a Hopf bifurcation and in its neighboorhood, the NSS displays a
limit cycle.
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